The question of the relationship between religion and other phcnome n · that come within its conceptual and semantic field, such as values, '1!1 the one hand, and modern economic development, 011 the other, h~1' occupied the minds of scholars since the last century. \x'./hile the issw· was first dealt with theoretically and sociologically by lhn Khaldun in the fourteenth century AD, it was taken up again in systematic fashinn by European classical social theorists in the nineteenth century. Ry rl-: turn of the twentieth century, North American, Japanese, and Jndi~11• sociologists, economists, and political scientists began to write ;1b01_1r the work ethic and other cultural or non-economic fauor. ' ' cl development. Since the Second World War many others have joined i n the debate. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss a number nl fundamental problems that underlie the media and academic discour :'e surrounding the question of religion and development in East Asi» rh~1r have to do with problematic Orientalist constructions.
Owing to the vastness of the field, however, there is the problem cl delineating my area of concern for this chapter. The field is vast, CO\'eri11g various world religions, numerous disciplines in the social sciences, :111-! a multitude of topics such as industrialization, economic gm· · rl1 education, and business firms. In addition, one has also to consider tf,,. budget of concepts that are related to religion such as ideology, oilt111'' values, and the work ethic. Even if one chooses to focus on a region <: ucl1 as Southeast Asia, one is not left with a more manageable task.
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the Indians and the Japanese, who insisted chat a form of 111oderni1atio11 chat selectively kept out Western influences and retained tradition WJ3 possible. Compatible with this position was the "discovery rhar tli:r•: were functional equivalents to the Protestant ethic to he found mit.:;ir.l" of the West. At the same time, efforts were being made to define Asia 111 terms of its various "culture areas" (Bacon 1964; Benda 1972) . The l0g:i'''I step was then to define Asianness in order that the ~lem~nts tl1:'t distinguished Asian from Western civilization could be_ 1de_nt1~ecl :1'_ 1 ·1 then made to constitute theoretical accounts of moderntzatton 111 Ae1:i, As a result, from the late 1960s onwards, several works <1ppe:11'.''1 that either attempted to identify functional equivalents to the l~rotesta" t ethic in non-Western societies or at least made a case for the existence !1! factors conducive to modern rational capitalism in the various world religions. It was in this way that religion became a category in rb e discourse on development.
It is, therefore, fitting to begin with chework of Max \V/eber biimdf in order to establish the criteria of assessment of chose works that 1n;1l:e Weberian or Weberian-inspired arguments in favour of a positi , -, correlation between "Asian" religions and modern rational c:1pirali:-111-
Syed Farid Alatas
What I p~opose, therefore, is to define my interest in the relationship between religion and economic development by way of limiting it with reference to a related concern, that of "Asian values". In what follows, I ta~e. the Asian values debate as my entry point into the topic of the ~el1g10us work ethic and its relationship with capitalist modernization 111 Sout~1east Asia .. I link this debate to scholarly concerns among economists and sociologists, beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, with ~he so-called Weber thesis and its implications for the study of the influence of non-Western religions on economic development. I then turn to a ~is~u~sion of Max Weber's Protestant ethic thesis, highlighting some of his insights as well as his Orientalist "errors". The sections after then d'iscuss a numb~r ~f problems associated with attempts to apply Weber s theory of capitalism to the East Asian area. These are, first, that th~ ~holesale and uncritical adoption of a Weber-type inquiry by many wrnmg on Ea~t Asia (within which I include Southeast Asia) unwittingly leads to a curiously auto-Orientalist position with regard to the role of Confucianism and Islam in the East Asian "miracle"; second, the instrumental use of "values"; and third, the failure to understand the complexity ofWeber's argument on the nature of the relationship between Protestantism and the rise of capitalism. These problems are found in both media and academic discourses. I follow with a discussion on the state and Asian values, concluding with some suggestions as to what a research agenda on the work ethic and the broader issue of values that is conscious of the above-mentioned problems might look like.
4: Religion, Values and Capitalism in Asia
Weberian Orientalism? Can we accept Weberian arguments, or do they have wl~at can .be o~lvl an "Orientalist" dimension to them? A case for Webenan One11t' . 'l1s1n can be made in two ways. One would be an inherent Orient:ilism in rl«; works of Weber, and the other would be how Weber's writings hr'
Puritanism is not against activity in this world. l.t is no; even a~:iin.st wealth acquisition. The moral objection to wealth 1.s the rehxatl<'!l 111 the security of possession, the enjoyment of wealth with the con.seqiie'.1'' of idleness and the temptations of the flesh, and above all, ~1sna;ttnn from the pursuit of a righteous life" (Weber 1958a, p. 157) . hir \V~d1:1· modern capitalism was the result of the melding b:tw:e!1 .c1ptt:i.l1'" enterprise and ascetic Protestantism, above all, of ~~e Calv1111st1c \Ttct"ll (Weber 1958a, p. 128) There are two important theoretical points to rnak.e .about th.e e~frcr of the Protestant Ethic on the development of the sp1nt of capttal1:oni. First there was an elective affinity or congeniality between Cal.ini-;111 and 'the modern capitalist attitudes or ethics. There is a conn~cti"11 between the irrational value commitments of Calvinism with rat10111l calculative economic conduct. The one seems irrational from the orhers point of view, but they come together in capitalism·.
, . . Second, the fact of congeniality is related to the idea that Cahn 1st~ did not consciously seek to create a capitalist system. Capitalirn1 was ;i•1 unintended consequence of the Protestant ethic. In other wor(~s. '.· e ought not to take a mechanical approach to values. 'W_e cann~t s1mph
invoke certain values and expect them to have the desired effects nncr people accept these values. spontaneous enjoyment oflife. In other words, the acquisition of money is not for the satisfaction of material needs, but for a higher reason as is evident from a quotation Weber gives us from the Bible: "Seest thou a man diligent in business? He shall stand before kings" (Weber 1958a, p. 53).
The attitude in pre-capitalist times was one of traditionalismman does not wish to earn more and more money but wants to live as he is accustomed to living, and to earn as much as is necessary for that purpose (Weber 1958a, p. 60) . This is the backwardness of traditionalism from a capitalistic point of view.
In contrast, in the spirit of capitalism both labourer and entrepreneur regard work as an end in itself, as if it were a religious calling (Weber 1958a, p. 63) . Therefore, the chances of overcoming traditionalism were greatest where there was religious upbringing. There was something about Protestantism which instilled an attitude in people that was very capitalistic in nature. It is opposed to traditionalism that is expressed, for example, in Catholicism that "activity directed to acquisition [of capital] for its own sake was at bottom a pudendum which was to be tolerated only because of the unalterable necessities oflife in this world" (Weber 1958a, p. 73).
Weber thus makes a distinction between the Catholic world and the Protestant world. In the successful capitalist centres of trademerchant capitalism -in Florence, Italy in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the capitalist spirit was considered ethically unjustifiable. In eighteenth century Pennsylvania, where there were very small, poor enterprises, the same attitude was "considered the essence of moral conduct" (Weber 1958a, p. 75) . Modern capitalism was to develop in those areas with the spirit of capitalism.
Capitalism requires an outlook on life that makes acquisition of capital a religious calling. Only then can it become a systematic way of life. Weber never claimed that capitalism could not exist outside the Occident. Rather, he claimed that the spirit of capitalism -an attitude of commercial gain and profit based on rational calculation -could originate only in the West, and was a result of certain characteristics peculiar to the worldly asceticism of Puritanism, a Protestant movement in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries derived in part from the to suggest that Asian values such as group spirit, mutual assi sra nee. f1 I i;i l piety, friendship, and value-ladenness (among scholars) would "defin itrl ' play a role in rectifying the adverse effects of modernization" Ip. l i) John Hall (1965 ), Ronald Dore (1967 ), Robert Bellah (1%8,1'1~(11 . and Herman Kahn (1979 were among the first to suggcsr ;1 po: -: i ti·' relation between a Confucian ethic and economic grmvth in Fast ;\cii This idea, in the hands of those who attributed an Orientaliv 0t1nc" tn Weber, provided the material on the basis of which defensive 'c;irrhc:• for functional analogues to the Protestant ethic in religinns ,,,,,l philosophies such as Islam, Buddhism, and Confucianism cnuld hi" tn:" \. The idea had been taken up by the political elite and in die nir'~i: • i" many East Asian nations during the last two decades. In Si1 1gapnrc. ,\,i· took the form of the "Speak Mandarin" Campaign, the inrrod1 1ctin11 nl the Arab world or in China because of these missing elements: all accrt ; , compulsion to work, a this-worldly asceticism and the tationali1atiu11 "' life.
The nature of Third World consumption of Weber has taken pbr·c with an assumption that for Weber, capitalism was an a(Lanv:rl. progressive economic system, and thus something "good and clc:ir:il~Jr'-and, following from this, that Western society was in this respect' t 1reru>< As a result, some non-Western students and scholars took a defo1sicr position and attempted to show that their own religions (!sl::i.111, Buddhism, Confucianism) were conducive to the de·,Tlor111• •11t
,,f capitalism, or that they were not against wealth acquisition.
In ciyh cases, Orientalist tendencies were attributed to the works of \)(!e+cr e·i'''' though they are not to be found there. The result of some such rel:ir-:-d reactions to these notions of Western superiority lead to the later cbi;r1 that "Asian values" had the functional equivalents to the Protestun t capitalist "spirit".
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To begi~ ~ith, _weber's own possible Orientalism. Weber's arguments about the ongm of modern rational capitalism in the West as embodied in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism should be read in the light of his comparative sociological studies of religion as seen in The Religion of India (I 958b) and The Religion of China (1951) .
In The Religion of!ndia, Weber's reading of "caste" and "Hinduism"
as defining and distinct features of Indian society is problematic on two counts. It betrays a textual reading of the phenomenon and an essentializing of Indian society, For example, Hinduism derived its name after a river, the Indus River in the Indian sub-continent, but is a name wh'.ch was imposed from the outside to encompass a wide variety of beliefs over a vast area of land. The adherents of such beliefs did not always consider themselves as belonging to a single entity that we now know as "Hinduism". Yet many textualist and essentialist studies of Hinduism subscribe to such constructed myths.
Similarly, Weber's reading of Confucianism and Taoism in The Religion of China is an instance of the imposition of the Judea-Christian notion of "religion" as if it were a universal category. Furthermore, Weber's characterization of Confucianism as "world affirming" and of "Confucian rationalism" as a "rational adjustment to the world" contributed to the image of Chinese society as static, unchanging, or at least as not inclined towards change. This again feeds into Orientalist constructions of the non-West as "passive", lacking a history and essentially "different" from the West.
Weber's _Orienta_lism, ~herefore, can be characterized as: (a) mixing fact and fiction; (b) tmposmg categories and concepts from the outside that clash with inte~1:al cultural self-understandings; (c) homogenizing heterogeneous entitles; (d) adopting a textualist approach; and (e) essentializing whole societies.
In contrast to the above, the attribution of Orientalism to Weber is the result of some reactions to his scholarship. According to Weber, the form that capitalism took in the West could only originate in the West because it required an attitude of commercial gain and profit, a "spirit" that generally emerged in Protestant-dominated areas of Europe. He acknowledged that although the Islamic and Confucianism world-views do stress frugality and hard work, the capitalist spirit did not emerge in Time and time again, it has been suggested that values explain economic progress. The values that were singled out, including the ones highlighted by Chen (1976) , are strong family ties, filial piety, frugality, discipline, thrift, diligence, hard work, and self-sacrifice. These values were not only held to be important factors in the process of economic development, but also the basic ingredients of a religious ethic.
It should be fairly obvious to most that these values are important for development. But it is also obvious that that these values are to be found in all the major philosophies and religions of the world. Certainly, they can be found in the doctrines and practices of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Islam. Yet, modern rational capitalism did not originate in the Islamic or Sinic civilizations. Even if the argument is made that a Confucian ethic interacts successfully with a capitalist system transplanted from the West, there are a number of objections that can be raised vis-avis the Confucian or Islamic ethic explanation of economic growth, the first six of which come under the general heading of "auro-Orientalisrn".
The first is the problematic presence of Eurocentric terms of reference. The point of departure is Eurocentric in that the terms of reference imply the superioriry, uniqueness, and desirabiliry of capitalism, the Euro-Protestant dimension of capitalism, and the propensity of Asia to become like Europe. It is contradictory that scholars suggest that "Religious Knowledge" as part of moral education in secondary schools in the early 1980s, and the later parliamentary White Paper on "Shared Values" (Kwok 1995; Wee, this volume f "th in the perfectibility of the human condition. :-dl onentat1on, at . cultivation, discipline, hard work, frugaliry, respect Fo_r authority. a grr:11p orientation, the importance of the family and the pnm_acy of educlt1"" Confucian (Kim 1994, P· 99) . It is one thing to claim that cet w1_1 \ ,11 LL.
• are found in religious doctrines and texts, and another ta _ch11_ n rhar these values are expressed empirically and are operative 111 t l« rationalization processes of daily life. . . . . . Consider another example. The claim that i ndividualism " suppressed in East Asian societies has often ~e~n made b~· reco~1iv: -t,'~ texts. Masayuki, for example, compares Christian symbolism 11;1tb ti b o l ic universe of Japanese religions and concludes that Jap;1I!' · sym f I · 1· · l 1 religious traditions do _not le~itimate the_ stat1. 1s o t 1~ !JH. 1 11!1(1 ~'':., (Masayuki 1998) . There rs nothing wrong with th1~ a~1proaJ1 as k \ .
it is not concluded that in practice, Japanese soctetres e11cour:igr ' devoid of an ethic analogous to that of Puritanism. In gener;il it is i'"t incorrect to say that capitalism was grafted on to pre-existing mrxle~ nf production and that it did violence to the social and intellectual s1ste1K of those times. We need to being seriously reconsider what is hein~! retrospectively claimed regarding high rates of growth lY in g rl_w as an unintended consequence.
The belief in the efficacy of values for growth and the sub:;ctj'1c111 flexing of Asian economic muscles, at least at the rhetorical le·;el ,,wl prior to the Asian financial crisis of 1997-99, fits in nicely ''··ith th'· thesis of the clash of civilizations. The idea of inter-civili7.atinnal rivaln made its entry into international political discourse with the publicati''ll of Samuel Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations" (1993) . \Vhilrc !ll'.l"' in Asia did not subscribe to Huntington's thesis rhar m.tio1nl ;111rl ideological conflicts are being replaced by civilizational 0ppositiow;. ir did appear that a clash was taking place, at least at the discursive le' ' 0\ For example, the thorny nature of the Anglo-Malaysia n rcb rinn<h i l' in 1994 took on overtones of moral rivalry between East :1tH1 ':VJ,oq, ii only at a rhetorical level. This is certainly the case on the Mab: <i:111 '~'1' of the argument, as Kuala Lumpur had criticized the British tor dn11 l,t111r~ the competence of Malay-Muslims, and for their wndesccnding cPl1'11i·11 attitude towards Malaysia.
society, this truth cannot be arrived at simply through the examination of Japanese religious symbols and texts.
The third problem is the widely recognized danger of essentializing the "nature" of a society's culture. This culturalist approach contends th~t there. is ~ uniquely East Asian driving force behind the process of Asian cap.1tahst development ~ Confucianism in the case of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, Islam for Malaysia, or the "shared values" of Singapore. The problem here is not the normative explanation but rather the positing of essential attributes of the system that appear to have been derived arbitrarily (Jayasuriya 1997).
Another problem aspect of the self-Orientalization of the culturalist explanation of East Asian development is the claim of uniqueness. For example, Harry Oshima agrees with Weber's description of the East Asian religions as being "more rational, pragmatic, and utilitarian than the ethical systems found in the other religions of Asia and hence conducive to the assimilation though not the emergence of capitalism" (Oshima 1986 , p. 7). But, as pointed out by Kim, features such as "this-worldliness" and benevolent authoritarian government are not confined to Confu~ianism alone, but are found in Taoism, Shintoism, and Mahayana Buddhism (1994, p. 100) and, I may add, other religions as well.
A related fifth objection is that even if it is true that economic practices informed by certain values can be identified, what remains unclear is if these values can be "located exactly in the Confucian portion of the culture" (Kim 1994, p. 88).
Sixth, there is also the tendency to make sweeping statements that hom~~enize regions. It has been said of Confucian values that it "proved surpnsmgly durable and found acceptance within the ethical fabric of mo~ern Japan .... Similar attitudes and values, whether directly attributable to a Confucian legacy or not, are now powerfully felt elsewhere in Asia and have been incorporated into the world transfor~iation that has taken place with the rapid emergence of the economic power of the nations of East Asia" (Calicutt 1995, P: 109).
Such statements need to be backed by empirical research into the beliefs and practices of communities.
It appears, therefore, that the social sciences in East Asia, at least as far as a section of the discourse on Asian values and the work ethic are 11 (
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Apart from issues of auto-Orienralism, the instrumental use of "1,;1lu<:''" in economic discourse and a failure to see the nuances in \'\!eber' s ;irg11 merits on the relationship between Capitalism's rise and Proresrnnti stn. Another example of the discursive clash of civilizations is the b(1t1t of criticisms of Western values and lifestyles which some have refern:'l to as "West-bashing". Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong of Singapore. ill his 1994 National Day Rally Speech, highlighted a number of asrecr:; of Western civilization which were in difficulty, including the breakup of the family, falling educational standards and a decline in moro liu Malaysia's Prime Minister, in a similar vein, had referred to the "corrosive individualism" of the West (Financial Times, 5-6 March 1994) . He h: 1d also called upon Malaysians "not to accept Western-style democracy ;ic it could result in ... moral decay, homosexual activities, single pare11rc, and economic slowdown" (Voice of Malaysia radio broadcast. 29 t\ l:n 1993, cited in Financial Times, 5-6 March 1994).
The State and Asian Values
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When the British media started to scrutinize and criticize Britishfunded development projects in Malaysia -which included the massive Pergau dam -and then proceeded to allege corruption among Malaysian lea~e.rs.' incl~di?g a "special payment" of US$50,000 to high-level politicians ( Wimpey Offered Contract Bribes to Malaysian Prime '."1inister", Sunday Times [London] , 24 February 1994), Kuala Lumpur imposed a ban on awarding government contracts to British firms, including privatized projects, and curbed the outgoing flow of government-sponsored undergraduate students to Britain. (Malaysia has the largest number of overseas students in the United Kingdom.)
Clearly, Kuala Lumpur saw the British actions as not just as an attack on the integrity and honesty of Malaysian politicians but an expression of.prejud.ic~al views held by former colonial masters on, as former Deputy Pnme Minister Anwar Ibrahim put it, "a country led by a brown Muslim" (~unday Times [London] , 13 March 1994). The imagery here was not simply one of an Anglo-Malaysian business war, but of a civilizational conflict. betwee.n "white" and "brown" peoples. In fact, even before AngloMalaysian affairs came under the halogen glare of publicity, Anwar had spoken of an "Asian renaissance" not only in economic but also in cultural and intellectual terms. He mentioned the need to launch a counteroffensive against the "imperialistic diffusion of Western or Westerninfluenc~d cultural products" (Straits Times, 1 February 1994). Not only must Asians be clear about their economic and political priorities, they must also set their own intellectual and cultural agendas, he added.
After the Kuala Lumpur-London row broke out, Dr Mahathir himself had said that his government's decision to stop giving government contracts to British firms constituted a means of economic arm-twisting which "we learnt from Western countries" (Sunday Times [London], 20 March .1994) . He accused the British media of still possessing a colonial rnentality and of believing that "non-whites can be easily bribed and can be bribed at any time ... " (Sunday Times [London], 20 March 1994) . In an interview by the London Sunday Times, Dr Mahathir agreed that there wa~ a racist element in the British media coverage of the Pergau dam affa~r and that there was an assumption that "all these peoplethese natives -are not straight. They all receive money and they run businessmen" (Muhaimin 1990, p. I) , but the term applies e<.11'.1\\,, rr• other Southeast Asian countries. Such "clients" include those from ,··itl1 in and without the bureaucracy.
State involvement in economic development in terms nf the rol e nf political parties and client businessmen is potentially da magi ng tn. rl , . . economy because very often those who obtain rights, licences, franch 17· and the like are neither qualified nor competent in business. Farrc,n:if,'.' represents a major means by which such bl.ISi.nessmen i.nin the ranl:c nf the economic elite. The disadvantage of this IS that major corporarv-!': that were established through patronage or through political p;'11' connections are not up to standard as far as efficiency, technical l:nnY how, and entrepreneurship are concerned. In this sense, the rnl e d rl1 r. · state in development is negative. .
Kleptocrats or "corrupters" extend various forms of favo11 rs .to f'Ti. '' 01"'
capitalists, and such favours may include ~ncentiv~s' . l ice ns i ns. protectionism, funding from state banks, concessions, and jornt ventures The relationship between kleptocrat and capitalist is one betwe~n patrnn and client. This is a special relation between a politically powerful p?tir'11 and a client who needs his/her protection due to the inadequacies of tlir formal economic institutions. Since colonial times, the Chinese ,,-,,c1" the clients of colonial patrons and although this relationship --,,,,. with the post-colonial state -continued after independence. p~rwn: 1 f'r was also extended towards the development of indigenous capital .
Patronage involves rent-seeking. This problem applies s~~cciflc~1l1 to the kleptocrat-capitalist relationship and has to do with rhe mcenr r c facing potential monopolists in the economy. Monopolists make 1w1lirc over and above the normal returns to capital. These profits rcprcscfl' ' · ' real net loss to society. However, there are further costs to society tl)' .lt arise from rent-seeking behaviour. In economics, "rent" refers ro rlir return to a factor of production that is in strictly limited i n supply 11· · competitive industry, economic profits are in limited suppk anr:l 1'1'' · seeking behaviour here refers to actions taken by firms to nht~itn ~, ,,1 preserve extra normal profits. Part of the profits are eaten 11p hv f!,,, expenses of rent-seeking behaviour such as bribes and oth:r for1 m "1 payment to state kleptocrats. Therefore, the social costs ro sqr!ctl iwlw\,· the extra-normal profits of monopolists as well as the panncnrs "1' "L·
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we also need to consider "Asian values" and the interventionist state in the analysis of values and development.
Following the Second World War and formal independence, many governments in Southeast Asia sought to expand the role of private capital in the economy. In many countries, the governments failed to create a viable indigenous capitalist class. The traditional role of the state in terms of regulatory functions by way of monetary, fiscal, and tax policies, licensing and subsidy programmes, and so forth, did not work. Many Southeast Asian states then decided to involve themselves in the sphere ofcapital accumulation beyond their regulatory and infrastructural roles. These states became directly involved in the process of capital accumulation through the establishment of state-owned enterprises and financial institutions. This role of the state manifests itself in a number of ways.
first, there are corporations established by the state, as well as those nationalized by the state. This is a well-known phenomenon in Southeast Asia and examples are plentiful.
Next, there is also the phenomenon of ruling political parties becoming major owners of, and investors in, business and properties. For various reasons, ruling political parties in Southeast Asia have acquired the means to buy, own, and manage major concerns. The extent to which this transpires varies from country to country, and it is most prominent in Malaysia. It is not easy to trace the links between the corporate sector and a political party. For example, while it is well known that the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) in Malaysia has a significant corporate presence in publications, communications, banking, insurance, property development, construction, hotels, manufacturing, and food retailing, it is hard to trace its links to these sectors because of the "informal way in which party assets are held, that is, through trustees or nominees appointed by party leaders, often as a means of political patronage" (Gomez 1990, p. 29) .
Another aspect of the state's involvement in the process of capital accumulation is corporate sector ownership by major political personalities, gained by virtue of their position in, or connections with, government. This may or may not be the result of nepotism. The group of capitalists that have evolved this way are known in Indonesia as "client ,'lyed Farid Alatas 120 for actors -that is, how actors consciously master their r~ality ci11rl legitimate their actions by way of various types of rationality. For exa1_np~c. Weber's interest in sixteenth century Puritanism was in regard to capitalist activity as meaningful social action. This led many to suggesr that \Y/elw' was an idealist because of his alleged stress on the religious/psychologi1~· :1l causes of the rise of capitalism. But Weber himself was very con5cion" nf the complex interplay between ideal and material factors.
In the General Economic History (1961) , Weber refer, to nvn\ materialist preconditions of the rise of capitalism: appropri:Hion of tl'c means of production; freedom of the market; mechanized technolog\: calculable, non-arbitrary adjudication and administration; free labou r: and the commercialization of economic life. One could argue that \'.:7f:bp1 saw the Protestant ethic as one ideal factor that could be added to a li<r of material factors.
What this implies is that a serious approach to the problerri d religious ethics, values, and development would e n ta i] a nH"' sophisticated application of Weber. Both material and ide1l factors ;11: c important in explaining East Asian economic development. East 1\'"' then presents us, by way of an empirical field, with the opporrunitv t'' go beyond the Weber thesis and to develop his general sociology, r;ikin? into account his sociology of law and authority in addition to lw sociology of religion. One may disagree with \Veber as far ;is h ic understanding of the substance of Confucianism, Hindu ism, and l~l:Hti go, but may find his institutional approach valid and useful (H;irnilrn11 and Kao 1987, p. 292).
Another aspect of Weber's work on the Protestant ethic that w;nP 11 t c more serious attention is the question of unanticipated consequenceFor example, against the commonplace view that Confucianism hinderc· ' . l capitalist development, could one suggest that it in fact may liave lv"·n an unwitting impetus to capital accumulation as Confw:iani't ' '' : craftsmen and merchants tried to "buy" their way out of their occupori: H 1 and to place themselves in a less despised class? Or, assuming that 't:1t1 .1' attainment is central to the Confucian world-view can ir he :irg11ed rli: 1' the effort to accumulate capital was directed to the goal of ""t11 c attainment and upward mobility, the unintended consequence \v· i11E the accumulation of vast stores of capital? ''.'.-:" 
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Towards a Positive Appropriation of Weber
Given the serious problems associated with the consumption of Weber in Asia, and the bad press that the "Asian values" discourse has received as a result of the conduct of many Asian states, what should our attitude be with respect to the utility of a Weberian sociology of religion as far as the study of the relationship between values and development are concerned?
Despite the various substantive and methodological weaknesses in Weber, the value of his theoretical contributions should be noted. For example, while he may have been mistaken about the nature of caste in India and about Confucianism in China, the larger point about the relations between and connectedness of religious, political, and economic structures is worth pursuing. Some positive aspects of his work follow.
The first is the balance between ideal and material factors. In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber seems to explain the rise of capitalism in terms of psychological or ideological motivations and refers to historical materialism as "patent nonsense". On the other hand, Weber stresses that it was not his intention to substitute a onesided idealism for a one-sided materialism. This issue can be resolved by making a distinction between Weber's conception of sociology and how he actually practised sociology.
To put it crudely, his conception of sociology was that it was an interpretive science which examined social action in terms of its meaning by the rent-seeking behaviour itself which aims to restrict competition and preserve such profits.
Given such a role of the state, and the fact that leaders like Soeharto and Park Chung-Hee ruled by appeal to certain elements of "Asianness", such as Javanese culture or indigenous democracy, it is not surprising that many had become sceptical of the notion of "Asia", The "Asian" idea "is a kind of sales gimmick, used for political and commercial public relations" (Buruma 1995, p. 66) . Apart from the fact that many local cultural practices are disappearing in Asia, what is often presented as "Asian values" either suspiciously promotes an authoritarian style of government, or is universal enough in practice so as to make them indistinguishable from, say, American values.
Conclusion
In looking at this relationship between values and development, there is a task of demystification at hand that is not simply an exposing of a gimmick, followed by placing oneself in the institutionalist rather than in the culturalist camp. A third position is possible, where local discourses on development are "authentic" in the sense that they are consciously theoretically articulated while at the same time grounded in the realities of the region and mindful of the pitfalls of auto-Orientalism.
I do not suggest that there is no such thing as "Asia" or "Asian values"
(as long as Asia is not understood as a homogeneous entity). It is now fashionable to dismiss the individualist-collectivist dichotomy when discussing differences between the West and Asia. But it is unfortunate that potential sound concepts that may emerge from the positing of such dichotomies are nipped in the bud because so many of us have become sceptical of a now-discredited discourse that was largely stateinitiated and dominated. Undoubtedly, for example, differences between Singapore and the United States as far as individualism is concerned exist. Those differences cannot be fruitfully captured by tendentious phrases such as "the corrosive individualism of the West". This is not to say that there are no areas of life in which Americans may display a greater or lesser sense of individualism than Singaporeans but only that intellectuals must not abdicate the serious investigation of values and developments. A critical assessment of both the social sciences and "Asian" discourses on the question of values and development should lead to a counter-Orientalist, counter-auto-Orientalist, and non-instrumental appropriations of classic works, such as those of Weber, for alternative thinking on religion, values, and capitalism in Asia.
Such questions cannot be answered without empirically oriented research to which the prevailing textualism and other problem remain as obstacles.
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